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I am pleased to be back home in Nebraska. It is a special 
honor for me to be chosen to deliver the prestigious E.J. Faulkner 
Lecture at my alma mater. In particular, I welcome this opportunity 
to speak to the students of the College of Business Administrat!ion 
because upon graduation many of you will take jobs that are 
directly linked to the international economy. . 
Even though the state of Nebraska is situated in the heartland 
of the united state and insulated by thousands of acres' of land, 
it is a maj or player in the global economy. We must educate 
ourselves on the economic and cuI tural similarities and differences 
of our foreign counterparts in order to effectively compete and 
cooperate with them. 
Competitiveness is a "buzzword" that one often hears inside 
the beltway these days. The news media, Congressmen and Senators, 
and Presidential candidates discuss how we must make the U. S . 
number one again by leveling the playing field so our firms can 
go head-to-head with foreign firms. 
Today I would like to talk about the progress we have made 
in leveling that playing field. And I would like to challenge 
those who are currently in the private sector, along with those 
who will soon be entering it, to take advantage of the global 
economic opportunities that are presently available. 
The Trade Deficit 
Over the past three years, the issue of international trade 
has been high on our nation's political agenda, perhaps higher· 
than ever before in our history. Record u.S. trade imbalances are 
partly responsible for this. But an even more fundamental reason 
is that many Americans are uncertain about how our nation will 
meet the challenges of the world's ever-increasing economic 
interdependence. 
To many the huge trade deficits of the past three years 
indicated that America was losing its competitive edge. Yet it 
is clear that the maj or cause of these trade deficits was not 
that the u.S. economy was too weak but that it was far stronger 
than the economies of our trading partners. 
For most of the mid-1980s, the u.S. economy was expanding so 
rapidly that our trading partne'rs could not keep up. As U. S. demand 
for goods increased, our imports rose. Unfortunately, foreign 
demand did not keep pace, so our exports stagnated. The healthy 
U. S. economy contributed to a strong dollar that priced U. S. 
exports out of many markets and made the price of imports extremely 
attractive. 
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President Reagan never succumbed to the self-defeating 
notion that because we had a trade deficit, there was something 
the matter with us. He recognized that the way to approach t~ade 
imbalances was to increase economic growth among our trading 
partners, not to slow growth in the U~S. 
The President's strategy has been a clear success. We are 
in the middle of the biggest export boom in our historY. We are 
selling textiles to Hong Kong, cars and televisions ,to Japan, 
steel to the soviet Union, even sand to Saudi Arabia. In the first 
eight months of 1988, the trade deficit was more than 22% below 
that of the same period last year, and at this rate it will be 
$30 billion lower for the entire year. 
The progress in real terms has been even more dramatic. 
Excluding the effects of inflation and exchange rate changes, the 
real, constant dollar trade deficit started improving in the 
third quarter of 1986 and is now about 40 percent below its peak. 
These achievements have taken place without the attendant 
economic pitfalls predicted by many. There has been no economic 
recession, which some said was necessary to dampen American 
demand for imports. There has been no surge of inflation, which 
others said would occur if the dollar depreciated against foreign 
currencies. And there has been no "deindustrialization" of our 
manufacturing sector, which many said was inevitable just a 
couple of years ago. 
The trade deficit turnaround could not have taken place at a 
more fortuitous time. We are now nearing the end of the sixth 
year of our economic expansion, which is already the longest 
peace-time expansion of this century. The trade correction is 
giving it a significant boost at a,time when many had expected it 
to run out of steam. The improvement in the real trade deficit 
has contributed close to a percentage point to GNP growth over 
the last two years. 
Now is not the time to rest, on our laurels, however. with 
capacity utilization rates over 83%, we cannot expect exports to 
continue growing at the dramatic pace of the last two years 
unless we add capacity or increase our productivity and 
competitiveness. This will have to be a cooperative effort, with 
the private sector increasing its investment in our economy's 
future and the government continuing to fight the federal budget 
deficit. It will be particularly important to increase our 
national savings in order to finance the reindustrialization of 
America while simultaneously reducing our dependency on foreign 
capital inflows. We must also devote considerable attention to 
the debt problem which continues to hamper trade and growth 
prospects among many less developed countries. 
r 
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The U.S. Response to Trade Imbalances 
President Reagan responded to the problem of internatiohal 
trade imbalances by promoting trade' liberalization abroad and 
enhanced economic competitiveness at home. On September 23, 1985 
he announced a trade policy aimed at opening markets throughout 
the world, thereby enabling the U.S. to reduce its trade deficit 
by increasing exports rather than decreasing imports. He followed 
up on this policy on February 19, 1987 by sending to Congress a 
comprehensive initiative that would allow America to maintain its 
competitive edge throughout the remainder of the century. 
The President's trade policy contains three parts: challenging 
the unfair trade practices of other nations, improving the 
fundamental economic conditions that govern trade patterns, and 
negotiating trade liberalizing multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements. 
Unfair Trade Practices President Reagan's campaign to 
reduce unfair trade practices and to increase foreign market access 
has been the most visible and sometimes the most controversial 
part of his trade policy. We are occasionally accused of being 
heavy-handed and aggressive in our demands for fair trade. 
Naturally we prefer to solve our bilateral trade problems quietly 
and without confrontation, but we cannot and will not pull back 
just because an issue proves to be "sensitive" in a foreign 
country. Trade issues are sensitive everywhere. 
Over the past three years we have challenged a number of unfair 
trade practices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. This 
approach has achieved important market-openings: beef, citrus, 
cigarettes and aluminum in Japan; ,beer, wine and cigarettes in 
Taiwan; motion pictures and insurance in Korea; and many others. 
We will continue to use section 301 whenever it is necessary to 
end unfair trade practices. Such practices are not the maj or 
cause of the U.S. trade deficit but they are a significant threat 
to the world trade system. 
Changing Economic Fundamentals The second part of President 
Reagan's strategy for reducing the U.S. trade deficit is the most 
important because of its far-ranging consequences for the economies 
of the world. We are attempting to cooperate on macroeconomic 
policy among the key trading nations in such a way as to increase 
trade flows and move existing imbalances toward equilibrium. 
Over the past three years, we have been encouraging our 
trading partners to adopt growth-oriented measures. This process 
began when U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker and Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Paul Volcker met wi th their counterparts from 
France, West Germany, Japan and Great Britain at New York's Plaza 
Hotel on September 22, 1985. The "Plaza Agreement" marked -the 
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beginning of a maj or effort to strengthen macroeconomic cooperation 
among the major trading nations. The success of this endeavor, 
coupled with our own actions on the Federal budget deficit;and 
elsewhere, has helped to catalyze an exchange rate realignm~nt 
resulting in an appreciation of the' yen, the mark, and other 
European currencies against the dollar. This realignment has nqw 
created excellent export opportunities for American fi~s. . 
Negotiating Trade Agreements The third part of! President 
Reagan's trade policy is to knock down trade barriers through 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The two most important 
negotiations we've undertaken in recent years are the U.S.-Canada 
Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations at the GATT. These two efforts at trade liberalization 
could have profound implications for U.S. trade policy for 
generations to come. 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Area. It is truly an historic agreement. For 
instance, in the latest figures we have available, Nebraska 
exports over 30 percent more to Canada than it imports from that 
country. Nebraska will benefit from the FTA because it provides 
for the phaseout of tariffs between the two countries and Canadian 
tariffs on average are the highest in the industrialized world. 
It will also eliminate various nontariff barriers and generally 
improve access to the Canadian market. 
The Reagan Administration devoted an enormous amount of time 
and effort to this negotiation because Canada is our closest ally 
and biggest trading partner. Our economic health and national 
security are inextricably bound up with the people of Canada. 
There is nothing in the world equivalent to the political open 
border between our two countries.·· Now we are on the way to an 
open economic border as well. That would be a truly remarkable 
achievement and each country would be far stronger as a result. 
The U. S . has now done its part. Pres ident Reagan signed 
implementing legislation just a month ago, following overwhelming 
Congressional approval. The fate of the agreement now rests with 
the Canadian national election which is just one week away on 
November 21. 
None of us in the United States can or should advise our 
Canadian neighbors how to vote in their own election. Nevertheless, 
I do believe this free trade agreement, with its many significant 
elements, is an opportunity of a lifetime. All tariffs will be 
phased out over ten years. Many restrictions on bilateral investment 
will be eliminated. We are creating a framework for trade in 
services. We are eliminating many trade distortions in the 




The second major negotiation to which the u.s. has devoted 
significant time and effort over the past several years is the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks. But before I get, to 
the specifics of the Uruguay Round negotiations, I would like /to 
put the whole issue of trade in agriculture in perspective ito 
help you understand why we must achieve global long-term agricul tura,l 
reform during this round of trade talks. ' 
The Internationalization of Agriculture 
We have learned over the past few decades that farming is no 
longer a local or even a national enterprise; it is world-wide in 
scope. A famine in Africa, a typhoon in Asia, or a budget crisis 
in Europe can have as much impact on a Nebraska farmer or agri-
businessman as events in our own country. 
Yet despite the global interdependence of agriculture , despite 
the vast improvements in communication and transportation systems, 
world-wide agriculture is lurching toward an ever-worsening 
cr~S1S. Farmers are more efficient and better producers than 
ever before, yet there are countries where people do not have 
enough food. There are massive agricultural surpluses around the 
world, yet consumers in many countries are forced to pay 
unnecessarily high food prices. 
These incongruities are primarily the result of government 
interf·erence in agriculture. Governments that subsidize production, 
erect trade barriers, and subsidize exports -- and I regret to 
say this includes all governments to some degree -- create the 
massive distortions that bedevil farmers and consumers. 
If governments cause these problems, then governments can solve 
them, primarily by getting out of the way. But no single government 
can solve the world's agriculture crisis; it has to be done 
multilaterally, in global negotiations. That, in essence, is the 
U.,S. approach. 
This means we must resist the temptation of seeking internal 
solutions only, especially those that would tell the American 
farmer how much or how little to produce. When we tried that before 
in a naive attempt to reduce agricultural surpluses, American 
farmers lost markets. These solutions did not work even in the 
1950s and 1960s when our market was primarily domestic. How 
could they possibly work in the 1980s when the agriculture market 
is international? 
The u.s. Agricultural Recovery 
American farmers have been through a lot during the last 15 
years. In the 1970s they faced sky-high interest rates and soaring 
inflation. President Reagan ended the inflationary spiral but 
many farmers who borrowed heavily to expand operations, in the 
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expectation of paying back with inflated dollars, found themselves 
in a painful credit squeeze. 
Ironically, America's strong economic resurgence had some 
unintended trade consequences. Foreign investors became bullish 
on America, strengthening the dollar in the mid-1980sand pricing 
many u. s. exports out of the world market. This created particular 
difficulties for agricultural exporters, who have to compete in 
price-sensitive farm markets. ! 
At the same time, other governments -- especially the European 
Community -- pushed agricultural production to the limits while 
subsidizing exports. It has now gotten to the point where farmers 
no longer compete with farmers; it is national treasury against 
national treasury, and farmers are merely pawns in the process. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) leads the way in this 
regard as probably the single most important barrier to 
u. s. agricultural exports. The EC' s variable levy, which is 
applied to all major grain-based products with the exception of corn 
gluten feed, acts as a quota. Coupled with high domestic price 
supports and export subsidies, the EC's system of variable levies 
has enabled the EC to go from being a major net importer to being 
~ a major net exporter of wheat, coarse grains, poultry, and beef. 
As a consequence, our agricultural exports to the Community 
have fallen sharply and we have lost markets to the EC in third 
countries. Indeed, the EC last year became the world's largest 
agricultural exporter, a disturbing development since it clearly 
would not have achieved that status on the basis of its 
competitiveness. 
Despite these problems, and qespite the additional problem 
of last summer's drought, American farmers have bounced back. 
This has been a cooperative effort between the Administration and 
our agricultural community. The Administration has poured a vast 
amount of financial resources into agriculture in recent years in 
order to keep American farmers in business. Not surprisingly, 
$20 billion or so of federal funds annually has made a difference! 
At the same time most farmers recognize that a permanent 
infusion of government support is not a sound long-term solution 
to their problems. If we're going to have a heal thy, viable 
agriculture, it must be based on a foundation more solid than 
that. Government dependency can easily, perhaps unknowingly, sap 
the traditional creativity and dynamism of American agriculture. 
since most farmers are unenthusiastic about having government 
as a major source of their incomes, we have to look for a better 
way. I believe we have found the answer in America's greatest 
strength -- its competitive ability. By getting government -- all 




farmer to go head-to-head with his competitors. 
we can win that contest. 
I am confident 
The Uruguay Round is truly a window of opportunity to achieve, 
on a multilateral basis, long-term agricultural reform as well;'as 
updating old rules and establishing new ones to discipline inter-
national trade. We have scheduled a meeting of trade ministers in 
just three weeks in Montreal at which we will review th~ progress 
of the Uruguay Round to date, chart the course for the/remainder 
of the negotiation, and ratify any agreements which may have been 
reached by them. Because of the significance of that meeting, 
and the importance of the entire Round to the world trading 
system, I would like to address this issue in greater detail. 
The Uruguay Round 
Forty years ago, in the aftermath of World War II, the majo~ 
trading nations created the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, thereby establishing guidelines and principles to regulate 
international t.rade. Since then,. all nations have benefited from 
lower tariffs and reduced trade barriers. International trade 
has expanded dramatically, stimulating economic growth and 
leading to undreamed of prosperity. 
Yet despite the obvious benefits of open markets, the 
international trading system is beset today by serious problems. 
Increasingly, countries are using export subsidies and non-tariff 
import barriers to achieve advantages over their competitors. 
To counter these disturbing trends, the world is turning 
once again to the GATT, seeking growth through trade liberalization. 
The Uruguay Round, launched in September 1986 in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, has the most ambitious negotiating agenda in the history 
of the GATT. 
The Uruguay Round negotiations are divided into 15 negotiating 
groups, each of which focusses on a different aspect of international 
trade. While it is essential to achieve progress in all these groups 
we are particularly concerned about three areas -- the so-called 
"new issues" of agriculture, services and intellectual property 
protection. These issues are not new to international trade, of 
course, they are just new to the GATT and because of that, we are 
meeting resistance from some GATT members. 
Agricul ture As I mentioned previously, global agriculture 
is near chaos because national governments are using trade policy 
as a weapon to gain advantages for their own farmers. In many 
countries, import restrictions and price supports keep internal 
agricultural prices high, thereby stimulating over-production. 
When surpluses occur, export subsidies are used to unload them on 
the world market, thus undercutting the ability of farmers in 
other countries to make a living. 
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This creates a world in which, even though farmers are more 
efficient and productive than ever before, there are countr;ies 
around the world where people do not have enough food. It creates 
a world in which, even though there are massive agricultutal 
surpluses, consumers are forced to pay unnecessarily high food 
prices. ' 
The u.s. has turned to the Uruguay Round for a way out of 
this appalling situation. We have proposed in the agricultural 
negotiations that all nations eliminate their trade-distorting 
policies as quickly as possible. We have suggested doing this by 
the year 2000. 
We include in our proposal all export subsidies, import 
barriers and domestic subsidies that affect trade. We exclude 
bona fide food aid programs and payments to farmers that do not 
affect pricing or production decisions. Finally, our proposal 
calls for instituting uniform food, animal and health regulations 
around the world to make sure that such regulations do not become 
non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade. 
Some negotiating partners have proposed immediate, short-
/' term steps to begin the process of dismantling international 
trade-distorting policies. The u. S. supports the concept of 
short-term measures. In fact, we have proposed an immediate 
freeze on export subsidies, domestic subsidies and market barriers. 
Let me be clear however. We will only take actions, short- or 
long-term, that are also taken by our trading partners. And we 
are not going to take short-term measures that do not contribute 
to comprehensive, long-term reform. 
Needless to say, there has been considerable resistance to 
our proposal -- particularly from the EC. Some Europeans say it 
is "unrealistic" to phase out trade-distorting practices. Well, 
I think it is irresponsible to insist on the status quo forever. 
When we meet in Montreal the u.S. will insist on a commitment to 
action at the negotiating table. 
Intellectual Property Protection Over the past four years, 
the united states has gone on the offensive internationally on 
behalf of improved protection for intellectual property, including 
patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets. This is an 
important issue because of the recent explosion in the piracy of 
patented and copyrighted goods. In 1986 alone, the entertainment 
industry reported losses of over $2 billion because of inadequate 
intellectual property protection. The computer and software 
industries reported losses of over $4 billion. 
within the Uruguay Round, we have worked to convince our 
trading partners that because the piracy of intellectual property 
'- has a trade effect, the issue is properly discussed in a GATT 
• 
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forum. The united states has proposed a comprehensive GATT 
agreement that would establish sUbstantive standards for protection 
of patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, and semiconduqtdr 
chip layout designs. In addition, the agreement would obligate 
governments to enforce intellectual property rights at the border 
and within national boundaries. 
I am disappointed that we have not made more progre~s in this 
area. There is no excuse for piracy. I cannot undevstand how 
any nation can defend it. And that is exactly what happens when 
pirating countries raise legalistic obj ections to the scope of 
the negotiating group's mandate. When we meet in Montreal, the 
u. s. will seek a consensus on the framework for a GATT intellectual 
property settlement. 
services Establishing rules for trade in services is high 
on our agenda because of the increasing importance of services in 
the u.s. economy. Despite the increasing internationalization of 
the world economy, there are few if any rules for trade in such 
essential industries as banking, insurance, transportation, 
construction and tourism. If the GATT is to establish order and 
fairness in the international marketplace , it must reflect the 
realities of modern commerce. 
To modernize the GATT, the U. s. has proposed that GATT 
principles also apply to international services transactions. 
The u. S • proposal, which has been endorsed by most developed 
countries, calls for the application to services of such traditional 
trade principles as transparency, non-discrimination, national 
treatment, the right of establishment, discipline on state-sanctioned· 
monopolies I discipline on subsidies I non-discriminatory accreditation 
procedures and a consultation and dispute settlement mechanism. 
Our objective in Montreal is to achieve a consensus on the 
outline of a services agreement. I am heartened by the realization 
of many developing countries that because they are competitive in 
many services industries, rules for international services 
transactions would help them. 
Conclusion 
The last three years have arguably been the busiest and most 
productive period in u.s. trade history. The outlook for u.s. 
exports is better now than it has been in a long time. We have 
reached a free trade agreement with Canada and are engaged in a 
global renegotiation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. We have solved many vexing trade disputes and we have 
prevented the enactment of protectionist legislation here in the 
u.s. 
still, much remains to be done and new challenges are appearing 
10 
on the horizon. I, for one, believe that the United states is 
still number one and I am not ready to relinquish this spot to 
any other nation. We still have the talent, the resources ,;the 
dynamism and the spirit to meet the challenges of the rest'.of 
this century. 
The great challenges that lie before us make it all the more 
important to achieve negotiating progress in the Uruguay Round if 
the central role of the multilateral trade system is to be preserved. 
Without such progress there will no doubt be a growing reliance 
upon bilateral and unilateral solutions to trade problems. At 
the same time, negotiating progress will be all the more difficult 
due to continuing trading system tensions. 
Clearly the challenges that face us are difficult and many. 
Yet, after all I have seen these past three years, I am sure that 
our best days lie ahead. As long as we keep our markets open and 
don't try to hide behind government barriers, our industries have 
the ability to remain on the cutting edge well into the 21st 
Century. By working together cooperatively, the private sector 
and the government can maintain our nation's greatness for another 
generation of Americans. 
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